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In
their post on Verfassungsblog, the Heidelberg research team around Armin
von Bogdandy proposes to enrich the “substance” of European citizenship with
the essence of fundamental rights and to let the ECJ control the observance of
this substance, upon request of national courts in the member states. However
sympathetic one might be towards the cause, the proposal encounters several
fundamental objections:
Juridification rather than politicisation as mode of integration?
The ECJ has promoted European integration within its case law. In fact, for the most
part the Court has altogether enabled European integration. The ECJ has produced
the ingredients for an ever deeper Europeanisation of the member states’ legal
systems (and thereby for a deeper integration), often to the great astonishment of
the contracting states. One need only think of direct effect (van Gend & Loos, 1963)
and supremacy of Community law (Costa v ENEL, 1964), direct effect of directives
(van Duyn, 1974) and liability of member states (Francovich, 1991), all of which saw
the light of day due to ECJ case law solely.
It has been the approach of the Court to substitute political integration with legal
integration. The approach worked unobservedly for a long time. It has, however, the
serious disadvantage that member states are exempted from the duty to deepen the
project of European integration politically since the member states do not have to
struggle for compromises anymore – wherever doubt exists they can count on the
ECJ to put the record straight and deepen integration.
The method of legal integration leads to the situation in which the project of
European integration lacks support within the member states’ populaces. The failed
referenda in the Netherlands and in France clearly show this lacking support. People
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neither understand the legal tricks of highly complex ECJ-decisions, nor identify their
elected representatives as the authors of deepened European integration since it
is the ECJ which provides the relevant stimuli. Besides, the elected representatives
can always claim to be bound by European Union law and can weasel out of the
cumbersome obligation to promote European integration in the member states’
public spheres. (This connection has not been sufficiently reflected in Habermas‘
most recent essay in which he uncritically adopts the supremacy narrative of certain
European lawyers.)
The proposal analysed here aims at deepening integration by legal means.
Essentially, the systematic infringement of media freedom and other fundamental
rights can be traced to a failure of domestic constitutional and fundamental rights
culture in the member states concerned. This is a political problem with which can be
solved solely by political means. A judgment of the ECJ, even a pivotal one, cannot
get to the root of the problem.
The desire for a faster, less cumbersome, more efficient response to infringements
of fundamental rights is all too understandable. In a democratic system, though,
there are requirements for the negotiation of new better solutions, particular
procedures are provided for. Hence, a democratic path has to be treaded to
implement the proposal of a rescue parachute for fundamental rights; a detour
through the back door of a highly complex construct of the essence of fundamental
rights as the substance of Union citizenship will simply not work.
Union citizenship as doctrinal gateway for the proposal?
Union citizenship is the central element of the proposal, the doctrinal gateway if
you like. Union citizenship was included in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 so as to
provide Union law with the civic element deeply missed up until then. Since then,
citizens of the member states are Union citizens at the same time.
It is unlikely the contracting member states envisaged what the ECJ would do with
the new instrument. Union citizenship, ruled the ECJ, grants the “fundamental
status” of political (as opposed to mere economic) affiliation to the European
Union for nationals of the member states (Grzelczyk, 2001). On this basis, the
ECJ obliged the member states to provide social security for non-national Union
citizens (Martinez Sala, 1998; Grzelczyk, 2001), without the member states having
contracted corresponding compensatory agreements.
Ruiz Zambrano, the case which is the starting point of the proposal of the rescue
parachute for fundamental rights, deals with right of residence resulting from Union
citizenship. Problematically, the case did not have any cross border aspect. After
all, only cross border aspects turn Union law applicable, hereby securing both the
principle of conferral and the principle of subsidiarity.
In Ruiz Zambrano, the ECJ used Union citizenship to find its way around the cross
border aspect. Union citizenship provided the means for the ECJ to seize jurisdiction
over a case that was not covered by its jurisdiction as traditionally understood – quite
a surprising turn of events, as has been noted elsewhere.
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By means of Union citizenship, the ECJ could circumvent the principles of conferral
and subsidiarity. This explains why the proposal for a rescue parachute makes
Union citizenship its starting point: Union citizenship allows reading political content
into Union law which was not there before, and without observing the procedures
provided for such purposes.
The comprehension of the strategy supplies an argument against it. One has not
to resort to the backward-looking sovereignty rhetoric of the Lisbon-Judgment and
can still acknowledge that the implications of the ECJ’s interpretation of Union
citizenship clearly indicate the necessity for member states to decide politically about
any such extension. Member states should politically negotiate extensions of Union
citizenship, they should not be introduced by the ECJ as an extensive interpretation.
One can understand the impatience of the ECJ which always wants more than
is available at the moment in the process of political integration (especially when
the Court strengthens rights of individuals as in aliens law). However, it should be
reserved for democratically legitimised procedures to take further steps of integration
in politically sensitive areas such as the scope of Union citizenship.
Therefore, it is not feasible to infuse Union citizenship with the essence of
fundamental rights simply by way of the ECJ’s interpretation. Rather, the member
states should decide about such an extension of the meaning of Union citizenship.
Such a step would change Europe as a community fundamentally, would establish
a new, independent, not only derivative political affiliation. This would be such a far-
reaching step that it would not be justified to introduce it through legal interpretation
by the ECJ but that it would need explicit negotiation between the member states in
public political communication.
The ECJ as guardian of fundamental rights?
The aim of the proposal discussed in this comment has to be appreciated, of
course: more rights and better protection always sound good. Who would oppose
it? Nevertheless, doubts arise whether the ECJ of all institutions is suited to do the
job. The doubts are based on prior experiences with the ECJ and its way of dealing
with the Union law. A normative-doctrinal approach towards the proposal will be
contrasted with an approach towards the proposal that takes into account the “law in
action” as it has appeared and evolved in history.
To begin with, the previous experience with the judicature of the ECJ makes it
advisable to be extremely cautious in providing the Court with further competences.
In hindsight still quite harmless was how the Courts constructed the direct effect of
directives – contrary to the letter of the relevant treaty provisions (van Duyn, 1974).
The Court authorised itself to examine framework decision which the member states
had not wanted and therefore had explicitly excluded (Pupino, 2005). Naturally, this
list could be extended manifold. The examples share the will of the ECJ to create
access privilege and to use it when and wherever the Court sees fit.
Considering this situation, it does not seem feasible to allow the ECJ to deeply
interfere with member states’ legal systems. Whereas the authors consider it a
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strength of the proposal that preliminary references by domestic courts should
only be allowed in cases of systematic infringements, on the flipside exactly this
precondition would ensure that resulting judgments of the ECJ will always have
wide-ranging political consequences in the concerned member state. After all, this is
the intention of the proposal – to create a mechanism to effectively fight systematic
deficits in the area of human rights. Mind you, by legal, not political means.
Art. 51 Abs. 1 CFREU states that the Charter addresses member states “only when
they are implementing Union law”. Although the authors claim that their proposal
is not an extension of the scope of the Charter, certainly it is not a very narrow
interpretation either. Admittedly, other proposals interpret Art. 51 Abs. 1 CFREU
even more broadly. However, considering the history of the ECJ even with the
proposal discussed here it must be feared that the Court will use this mechanism
to control the political systems of the member states and to interfere with them on
an unprecedented scale. Should it be the intention of the proposal to suggest a
moderate interpretation of Art. 51 Abs. 1 CFREU under all those conceivable, at the
latest the jurisdiction of the ECJ would not let it stand at that.
In the history of Germany, it did not work out to manifest the “essence of the
essence” (“Wesen des Wesens”). It seems unlikely that this task will get any easier
on the European level with 27 different constitutional traditions. Considering the
record of the ECJ, which always displayed an extensive jurisdiction, it would be
dangerous to offer the ECJ such a powerful tool.
Outlook: Hope for the protection of fundamental rights in political processes
Art. 2 and 7 TFEU state that member states among themselves shall address
infringements of fundamental rights which do not occur while implementing
Union law primarily by using political disciplinary measures. Discernibly and
understandably, the authors of the proposal are disenchanted with the lack of
political will to intervene against member states that infringe media freedom. In the
past, such a will was more often than not was amiss. The dealings with Austria’s
Haider in the 1990s, with Italian’s Berlusconi up until recently and with Hungary’s
new government now have always been difficult.
Nevertheless, these experiences should not inhibit member states from
communicating and demanding results. There are ways and means to improve the
situation in political processes; an astonishing example was recently provided by
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s questioning in the European Parliament.
This example shows how democratic responses to a national course considered
misguided can look like. This experience raises hopes that political processes can
bring about solutions, too.
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